The Impact of Issues on the 2016 Presidential Election in Taiwan by Tan AC et al.
The Impact of Issues on the 2016
Presidential Election in Taiwan
Cal Clark, Auburn University 
Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas 
Alex C. Tan, University of Canterbury and
National Chengchi University
Prepared for presentation at the 2016 Annual Meeting of
the  American  Political  Science  Association,  San
Francisco.
1
The January 2016 presidential and legislative elections in
Taiwan certainly produced a dramatic and unprecedented victory
for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over its long-time
rival the Kuomintang (KMT).  While Chen Shui-bian had captured
the presidency in 2000 with 40% of the vote and in 2004 with 50%,
in  2016  Tsai  Ing-wen  swept  to  victory  with  a  decisive  56%
majority over the KMT’s Eric Chu (31%) and the People First Party
(PFP)’s James Soong (12%).  The DPP’s victory in the Legislative
Yuan represented even more impressive gains.  The DPP had never
had a parliamentary majority before 2016, either alone or in a
coalition with smaller allied parties.  In 2016, in dramatic
contrast, it increased its number of seats from 40 in 2012 to 68
in the 113-member Legislative Yuan, as KMT membership collapsed
from 64 to 35.  One seeming contribution to the DPP triumph was
that a substantial number of KMT voters, in particular those
residing in China, stayed home, leading to a significant decline
in the overall turnout rate from 74% in 2012 to 66% in 2016.
Furthermore, while receiving lesser notice, the New Power Party
(NPP) won 5 seats, marking the first electoral success in Taiwan
politics of a “protest party” not associated with a defecting
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faction or leader of one of the two major parties (Copper, 2016;
Fell, 2016; Hsieh, 2016; Templeman, 2016; Wu, 2016).
The dramatic DPP victory suggested that fundamental change
may have commenced in the nature of Taiwan politics, particularly
in the partisan balance (Clark, Ho, and Tan, 2016; Hsieh, 2016;
Templeman,  2016).   Another  area  of  possible  change  is  the
relationship  between  the  issue  position  of  Taiwan  voters  and
their voting patterns.  For most of the country’s democratic
history national identity has been the dominant issue in its
politics (Clark and Tan, 2012; Fell, 2005, 2012; Hsieh, 2002,
2016).  Two other issues may be becoming more salient, however.
First, Taiwan’s declining economic performance could have made
economic  issues  more  important;  and,  second,  widespread
alienation from political elites could have become a significant
issue as well.  This paper, then, explores how issues affected
presidential  vote  in  the  2016  elections.   The  first  section
provides an overview of the election; the second describes the
research design; and the third reports our analysis.
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Overview of the 2016 Presidential Election
The decisive 2016 DPP victory had been building for four
years.  In January 2012, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election
by a margin of 52% to 46% over the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen.  This was
considerably less than his margin in 2008; and the KMT’s majority
in Legislative Yuan saw a similar reduction.  Still, Taiwan’s
citizens had given Ma and the KMT a vote of confidence.  It
turned out be an extremely short mandate, however.  Within six
months of his election, Ma’s approval rating had plummeted to
15%, which broke Chen Shui-bian’s record low of 18%; and his
popularity  never  rose  very  significantly  after  that.   This
tumultuous  drop  reflected  the  confluence  of  several  factors.
First, Ma, as is common among many incumbent chief executives,
put off several unpopular decisions until after he was safely re-
elected.  Second, there was a major corruption scandal. Third,
Taiwan’s economy slowed markedly from 4.2% growth in 2011 to 1.5%
in  2012.   Finally,  Ma’s  troubles  were  compounded  by  growing
strains within the Kuomintang which weakened his ability to pass
items in his program through the legislature (Chen, 2013; Clark
and Tan, 2016; Hsieh, 2014; Templeman, 2016). 
Popular discontent with Ma and the KMT came to a head in the
spring of 2014.  The Ma administration sought to expand the free
trade pacts with the PRC that had been negotiated in his first
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term  when  it  signed  the  Cross-Strait  Service  Trade  Agreement
(CSSTA) with Beijing in June 2013.  This was a major proposal
that  included  financial  services,  communications,  health  and
social  services,  business  services,  transportation,  tourism,
environmental services, and distribution services.  The Agreement
immediately became highly controversial (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2014,
2015).   No  progress  was  made  in  considering  it  as  the  Ma
administration  showed  no  interest  in  compromise;  and  the  DPP
showed no interest in moving forward in the Legislative Yuan’s
consideration of the CSSTA.  Then a volcano erupted in mid-March
2014 when the Joint Committee Review Meeting on the CSSTA in the
Legislative Yuan ended in chaos.  Lawmakers from the DPP and
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) seized the podium and prevented the
KMT’s Chang Ching-chung from presiding.   Finally, Chang declared
that  the  meeting  was  over  and  that  the  review  period  was
complete, clearing the way for a vote on the trade pact and
leading the DPP to protest vociferously.  The next day, protests
commenced  outside  the  Legislative  Yuan;  and  in  the  evening,
students accompanied by some DPP legislators entered and occupied
the Legislative Yuan, thereby setting off the Sunflower Movement.
The Ma administration ignored the demands of the Sunflowers and
indicated that the CSSTA should be approved as is, creating a
stalemate.  The occupation of the Legislative Yuan continue for
five weeks until Speaker Wang agreed to develop and implement a
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program for monitoring cross-Strait agreements before acting on
the  CSSTA.   Due  to  partisan  polarization,  however,  nothing
happened on this.  Public opinion polls in the spring of 2014
showed the Sunflower Movement to have extremely strong public
support (Fan, 2014; Hsieh, 2015; Liu, 2014; Smith, 2015; Smith
and Yu, 2014; Sui, 2015; Wang, 2014; Wei, Wang, and Hsu, 2014).
In  political  terms,  the  Sunflower  success  made  a  major
contribution, although certainly not the only one, to the fall of
the KMT, which was trounced in the 2014 local elections (Copper,
2014; Hsieh, 2015).
There was only a little over a year from the November 2014
local elections and the January 2016 presidential and legislative
elections.   Little  occurred  that  would  have  brightened  the
spirits of KMT members.  Rather, the economy worsened, enhancing
the problem of inequality and reinforcing public perceptions that
the Ma administration cared little for the poor or the young
whose bleak job prospects had led them to be called “Taiwan’s
lost generation.”  Furthermore, students appeared to be strongly
opposed  to  ongoing  attempts  to  mandate  a  more  China-centric
curriculum.  Thus, the younger generation had added reasons to
the repression of the Sunflower Movement as a reason to feel
alienated  from  the  Kuomintang  (D.  Chen,  2017;  Copper,  2016;
Gerber, 2016; Hickey and Niou, 2016; Wu, 2016). 
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Consequently, as the campaign commenced, the DPP appeared to
be far better situated than their major party rival.  The DPP
nominated Tsai Ing-wen as their presidential candidate with no
formal opposition and went into the campaign with a united party.
Tsai was able, moreover, to negate the usual KMT advantage on the
central issue of cross-Strait relations.  In the past, those who
want Unification with China supported the KMT; and those who
favored  Independence  voted  for  the  DPP.   The  tipping  point,
however, was the half or more of the electorate who wanted the
ambiguous Status Quo to continue.  These citizens on average saw
the  KMT’s  stated  policy  of  “one  China  with  different
interpretations” by the ROC and PRC as supporting the status quo,
in contrast to the DPP’s total rejection of this so-called “1992
consensus”  between  China  and  Taiwan,  a  position  that  Beijing
claimed was totally unacceptable.  Tsai stated that she supported
the status quo in cross-Strait relations and made no mention of
the 1992 “consensus” that there was “one China” but that the ROC
and PRC had different interpretations of what it was -- which was
associated with Ma and the Kuomintang and which had been harshly
criticized  by  the  DPP.   Disarray  within  the  Kuomintang,
furthermore,  made  this  position  look  moderate.   Presumably
because they assumed that Tsai would win easily, none of the
senior KMT officials who were expected to contend for the KMT
presidential nomination entered the fray.  Instead the Deputy
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Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Hung Hsiu-chu, won without much
opposition.  Hung was a fierce critic of Taiwan Independence and
stated  that  she  believed  in  “One  China,  Same  Interpretation”
which was widely interpreted as support for Unification.  Polls
showed her to be quite unpopular; and the KMT’s prospects looked
ever more dismal when James Soong of the PFP announced that he
would run.  In October, the KMT dumped Hung as a candidate, which
enraged her supporters, and replaced her with Eric Chu, the Party
Chairman and Mayor of New Taipei City.  Chu did little to revive
popular support for the KMT, though (Copper, 2012; Hickey and
Niou, 2016; Hsieh, 2015, 2016; Wu, 2016).  
Research Design
Our research design for estimating the impact of issues on
presidential vote is based on the two-stage model in Figure 1.
In the first stage, three issues are used to explain who voted
for Tsai as opposed to Chu or Soong.  In the second stage, seven
demographic factors are added to the three issues to examine how
they affect the relationship between issues and vote, as well as
being  used  to  explain  why  Taiwanese  voters  hold  the  issue
positions that they express.  The data are taken from Taiwan’s
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2016 Election and Democratization Study (TEDS, 2016).  Binomial
logistic  regression  is  then  applied  to  estimate  the  various
effects in this model.  All the variables used are dichotomies
with the values of 0 and 1.  There are multiple indicators of the
three  issues  under  consideration  here  (national  identity,
economic concerns, and alienation from political elites).  For
national  identity  and  political  alienation,  the  one  with  the
strongest relationship with presidential vote was included in the
analysis.   There  do  appear  to  be  two  separate  dimensions  of
economic stress, in contrast.  Consequently, two indicators were
used to represent this dimension.  
Figure 1 here
All the variables and their codings are listed under the
arrow diagram in Figure 1.  For Presidential vote, Tsai (63%) is
coded 1; and Chu and Soong are coded as 0 (37%).  The indicator
for national identity, what Taiwan’s International Status should
ultimately be has three categories: independence (31%), status
quo (56%), and unification (13%).  For the logistic regression
equations, Independence (0 = No; 1 = Yes) and Unification (0 =
No; 1 = Yes) are used as dummy variables, while Status Quo is the
baseline.   The  two  indicators  of  economic  stress  are  the
perception that Taiwan’s economy had gotten worse in 2016 (0 =
No; 1 = Yes), with 57% agreeing that it had, and the belief that
inequality was severe (0 = No; 1 = Yes), with 61% agreeing that
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it  was.   Finally,  political  alienation  was  measured  by  the
perception that government decisions promote public welfare (0 =
No; 1 = Yes), with which 47% agreed.  Six of the demographic
characteristics were divided into dichotomies:  income (over and
under 59,000 NT$ per month); occupation (white collar and other);
education (more or less than a junior high education) gender
(male  and  female);  age  (under  and  over  40);  and  area  (South
versus  North  and  East),  with  high  income,  white  collar
occupation, more education, female, older age, and South being
coded 1.  For father’s ethnicity, we used the two categories of
Min-nan Taiwanese and Mainlander to form dummy variables.  In
addition, when party identification is converted into a dichotomy
between  blue  and  green  parties,  it  had  an  extremely  strong
association with presidential vote, as shown in Table 1:  the
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 is .84; the Odds Ratio is 393; and the
logistic regression classifies 95% of the voters’ presidential
choices correctly, in contrast to the 63% in the modal category
of Tsai.  Thus, we did not include party identification in the
analysis.
Table 1 here 
Table 2 lists the hypothesized relationships between voting
for Tsai and the issue positions and demographic variables.  We
posit that Tsai would appeal to Taiwanese nationalism; so that
Independence, South, and Min-nan Father should have a positive
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relationship with Tsai Vote, while Unification and Mainlander
Father should have a negative one.  Tsai and the DPP should also
appeal  to  the  more  marginalized  members  of  Taiwan’s  society.
Consequently,  Economy  Worse  and  Inequality  Bad  should  be
positively related to and Government Promotes Public Welfare,
Income,  Education,  and  White  Collar  Occupation  should  be
negatively  associated  with  supporting  the  DPP’s  presidential
candidate.  In addition, the KMT’s alienation of younger voters
(see previous section) indicates that age would be negatively
associated  with  Tsai  vote,  while  being  female  should  have  a
positive association since Tsai was the only women in the race.  
Table 2 here
Analysis
Our  analysis  was  developed  in  three  stages.   The  first
examined the bivariate association between issue position and
presidential  vote.   The  second  adds  the  demographic
characteristics to the explanatory equation in order to ascertain
that the observed correlations between issues and supporting Tsai
at the polls are not just the result of these control variables.
Finally, the demographic factors are used to explain each of the
five issue positions.
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Table  3  presents  the  results  for  bivariate  logistic
regressions between Tsai vote and the five issue indicators.  All
are in the predicted directions (Independence, Economy Worse, and
Inequality  Bad  positive;  Unification  and  Government  Promotes
Public  Welfare  negative)  and  highly  significant  statistically
(.0004  or  less).   Independence  has  by  far  the  strongest
correlation with a Psuedo R2 of .21, while the other four have
Pseudo R2s in the .05 (Economy Worse and Inequality Bad) to .07
(Unification and Government Helps Public Welfare).  It is also
instructive  to  examine  the  crosstabulation  between  Taiwan’s
ultimate political status and presidential vote in Table 4.  As
expected because of the large difference between their Pseudo
R2s, Tsai’s margin among pro-Independence voters is considerably
greater  than  the  two  Blue  candidates  advantage  among  pro-
Independence citizens (88% to 11% versus 67% to 33%).  Moreover,
despite the Kuomintang’s previous support by those who want the
status quo (see previous section), Tsai actually carried this
group 53%-47%. 
Tables 3 and 4 here
The  bivariate  results  are  consistent  with  national
identity’s  being  the  dominant  issue  in  the  2016  election.
However, when all five issue positions are included in a logistic
regression explaining Tsai Vote in Table 5, political alienation
and  perceptions  of  economic  problems  retain  their  highly
12
significant  impacts  in  the  predicted  direction  (.006  for
Inequality  Bad  and  .0004  for  the  other  four  independent
variables).  The Adjusted Odds Ratios are 6.91 for Independence,
2.05  for  Economy  Worse,  and  1.41  for  Inequality  Bad  (the
independent variables with positive associations with Tsai Vote)
and  .42  for  Unification  and  .47  for  Government  Helps  Public
Welfare (the independent variables with negative associations).
Furthermore, adding the three indicators of economic distress and
political alienation to the equation raises the Psuedo R2 to .32
from .23 when just Independence and Unification are included in
the logit.  The classification analysis provides another insight
into the 2016 voting dynamics.  The regression equation predicts
72% of the votes correctly compared to 63% in the model category
of Tsai vote.  In addition, though, the impact of issues on vote
was noticeably stronger for Tsai supporters (81%) than for those
who cast their ballots for one of the Blue candidates (58%).
Table 5 here
The second stage in the analysis is to examine the effects
of adding the demographic characteristics to the analysis.  Table
6  reports  the  results  from  a  binomial  logistic  regression
including both the five issue positions and the eight demographic
factors.  The demographic factors clearly add to the explanatory
power of the regression analysis.  The Psuedo R2 rose to .39 from
.32  when  just  the  issues  were  included  in  the  explanatory
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equation; and the classification analysis predicted 76% (66% for
the two Blue candidates and 82% for Tsai) of the votes correctly,
up from 72% for the five issue positions.
Table 6 here
For this paper, the key finding is that controlling for the
demographic  characteristics  of  Taiwanese  voters  changes  the
impacts  of  the  individual  issues  very  little.   All  five
relationships are statistically significant and in the predicted
direction.  The significance of Inequality Bad does rise to .035,
but the other four independent variables are significant at the .
001  level  or  less.   Furthermore,  their  Adjusted  Odds  Ratios
(AORs) are quite similar:  6.01 versus 6.91 for Independence; .48
versus .42 for Unification; 2.30 versus 2.05 for Economy Worse;
1.42  versus  1.41  for  Inequality  Bad;  and  .50  versus  .47  for
Government Helps Public Welfare.  Overall, therefore, national
identity continued to be the most important issue in the 2016
presidential election.  However, both economic unhappiness and
political alienation had quite significant effects as well.
Three  demographic  factors,  Min-nan  Father,  Mainlander
Father, and South (where native Taiwanese nationalism is most
intense), are associated with ethnicity.  Only one of them has a
significant  impact  on  Tsai  vote.   This  is  Mainlander  Father
which, as predicted, has a negative relationship with Tsai Vote:
b = -1.20; Sig = .0004; AOR = .30.  Similarly, there are three
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indicators  of  socioeconomic  status,  Income,  Occupation,  and
Education.  Of these, only Education is significant, with the
less educated being the most supportive of Tsai:  b = -.73; Sig =
.001; AOR = .48.  The alienation of youth is also evident in
these results as younger Taiwanese are clearly more supportive of
Tsai than their elders:  b = -.59; Sig = .001; AOR = .56.
The  third  stage  of  the  analysis  is  to  determine  how
demographic characteristics influence issue stances in Taiwan.
Here, we made five hypotheses.  First, that demographic traits
would shape issue beliefs quite significantly (H1).  Second, that
the  indicators  of  ethnicity  would  have  a  stronger  impact  on
national  identity  than  the  measures  of  economic  stress  and
political alienation do (H2).  Third, that the reverse would be
true for economic stress and political alienation (H3).  Fourth,
that  younger  age  would  be  associated  with  more  support  for
Independence  and  higher  levels  of  both  economic  stress  and
political  alienation  (H4).   Finally,  that  gender,  especially
since it does not have a statistically significant relationship
with presidential vote, would have little effect on any of the
five dependent variables (H5). The results for these binomial
logistic regressions are reported in Tables 7 to 11.  The first
hypothesis clearly does not hold.  While all five are highly
significant statistically at the .0004 level, the combine impact
of the eight demographic traits is weak in all of them.  For
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example, the Psuedo R2 for Independence is only .09; and the ones
for the other four dependent variables are even weaker in the .04
to .06 range.   
The  results  for  Independence  and  Unification  strongly
support H2 and H4, but provide mixed results for H5.  Two of the
indicators  of  ethnic  identification  in  Table  7  influence
Independence,  while  socioeconomic  or  SES  has  no  significant
effects, which is in line with H2.  Mainlander Father has an AOR
of 1.99 that is statistically significant at the .011 level; and
Min-nan father is marginally significant (.069) with an AOR 0f .
56.  H4 and H5 also hold for this dependent variable.  Younger
Taiwanese are much more likely than their elders to advocate
Independence  (AOR  =  2.49;  Sig  =  .0004),  while  these  is  no
relationship between independence and gender.  The results in
Table  8  are  quite  similar  for  unification  with  the  glaring
exception of the fact that gender has a strong impact with men
being the most supportive of Unification (AOR = .56 which is
significant  at  the  .001  level),  thereby  disconfirming  H5.
Otherwise, the relationships are quite similar to, but in the
opposite direction from those for Independence, in line with H2
and H4.  Mainlander Father has a highly significant impact (AOR =
1.99;  Sig  =  .001),  while  Min-nan  father  has  a  marginally
significant one; the three SES indicators exercise no independent
effects; and Age has the strongest influence in the explanatory
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equation  with  older  Taiwanese  being  the  most  supportive  of
unification (AOR = 2.49; Sig = .0004), consistent with H4. 
Tables 7 and 8 here
 In sharp contrast, H5 was the only hypotheses receiving
unambiguous support for the three indicators of economic stress
and political alienation, as gender has no independent effect on
any of these three dependent variables in Tables 9 to 11.  The
expectation H3 that the indicators of SES would have a stronger
impact  than  those  for  ethnic  identification  only  holds  for
Government Promotes the Public Welfare and is the reverse for
Economy Worse, while these two sets of independent variables are
approximately  equal  in  their  influence  on  Inequality  Bad.
Finally, despite younger Taiwanese being hypothesized to have
higher levels of economic stress and political alienation (H4),
the only significant impact of age was on Economy Worse and in
the opposite of the predicted direction.    
Tables 9 to 11 here
Table 9 presents the results for perceptions that Taiwan’s
economy got worse in 2016.  Here, in direct contrast to H3 and H4,
none of the SES indicators are associated with the dependent
variable; and older Taiwanese are the most likely to see economic
decline (AOR = 1.85; Sig = .004).  In addition, two of the three
ethnic identification items have at least a marginal influence:
South (AOR = 1.38; Sig = .008) and Min-nan father (AOR = 1.30;
17
Sig = .087).   In the logistic regression for Inequality Bad in
Table 10, there are only two significant independent variables:
Education (AOR = .60; Sig = .002) and Min-nan Father (AOR = 1.55;
Sig = .005).  Consequently, these results are consistent with
neither H3 nor H4.  Finally, the results for Government Promotes
Public Welfare in Table 11 are consistent with H3 because the SES
indicators have a stronger impact than the ethnicity ones but not
with  H4 because  age  is  not  associated  with  the  dependent
variable.  The three independent variables that are significant
are  two  indicators  of  SES  and  one  of  ethnic  identification:
Occupation (AOR = 1.64; Sig = .003), Income (AOR = 1.38; Sig = .
01), and South (AOR = .75; Sig = .02).
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Implications
This  paper  has  examined  the  impact  of  issue  voting  on
Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, in particular the hypothesis
that  concerns  about  the  economy  and  malfeasance  among  the
political elites had joined the traditionally dominant cross-
Strait relations as influential issues.  The hypothesis received
strong support from the bivariate correlations of five indicators
of  the  three  issues  with  presidential  vote,  the  multivariate
relationships of the issue positions on Tsai Vote in a binomial
logistic  regression,  and  even  after  the  demographic
characteristics  of  Taiwan’s  citizens  were  controlled.   In
contrast, using the demographic factors to explain the five issue
positions was far less fruitful.  Their combined impact was weak;
and  the  results  were  mixed  concerning  the  predicted
relationships.
Taiwan politics may well be entering a period of uncertainty
and instability.  Analysis of the 2016 elections suggests that
the duopoly that the DPP and KMT have enjoyed over the political
system may be coming under challenge (Clark, Ho, and Tan, 2016).
More recently, despite few signs of revival for the Kuomintang,
President Tsai’s approval rate had plummeted to 33% after her
first year in office (W.H. Chen, 2017).  The same thing may be
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happening in the realm of issues’ role in elections.  First, our
analysis implies that new issues are becoming more important.
Second, while the 2014 and 2016 elections were widely interrupted
as representing a rejection of the KMT’s approach to cross-Strait
relations (Copper, 2014, 2016), Tsai’s policies in this area were
only approved by 35% of the citizenry (W.H. Chen, 2017; also see
Hickey and Niou, 2017).  Consequently, the partisan divide over
the  long-standing  central  issue  in  Taiwan  may  be  subject  to
change  as  well.   It  is  certainly,  “interesting  times”  for
students of Taiwan politics.  It remains to be seen, however,
whether this will be a blessing or a curse.
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Figure 1
Model of Voting Dynamics
Issue Positions (3)





0=Chu or Soong; 1=Tsai            
Issues
Taiwan’s Ultimate Status
    Independence:      0=No; 1=Yes
    Unification:       0=No; 1=Yes
Govt Helps Soc Wef:    0=No; 1=Yes
Inequality Very Bad:   0=No; 1=Yes
Tai Econ Worse:       0=No; 1=Yes
Demographic Characteristics
Income:            0=Under NT$ 59,000 a month; 1=Over $59,000
Occupation:        0=Not White Collar; 1=White Collar
Education:     0=Jr. High or Lower; 1=High School or Higher
Gender:            0=Male; 1=Female
Age:               0=Under 40; 1=Over 40
Area:              0=North & East; 1=South
Taiwanese Father:  0=No; 1=Yes
Mainlander Father: 0=No; 1=Yes
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Table 1
Bivariate Association of Party Identification with Tsai Vote*
Party ID              b      Nagelkerke    Sig.   Odds Ratio**
Pseudo r2     
Green  5.97   .84    .0004 393.08
Classification Analysis
Correct Predictions 





*Based on binominal logistic regression.
**Unadjusted because there is only one independent variable.
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Table 2







Govt Helps Public Welfare Negative
Demographic Characteristics
High Income Negative









Bivariate Association of Issue Position with Tsai Vote*
Issue Position        b      Nagelkerke    Sig.   Odds Ratio**
Pseudo r2     
Independence  2.13   .21    .0004 8.45
Unification -1.41   .07    .0004  .25
Economy Worse   .81    .05    .0004 2.25
Inequality Bad   .78   .05    .0004 2.18
Government Helps
   Public Welfare  -.99   .07        .0004  .37
*Based on binominal logistic regression.
**Unadjusted because there is only one independent variable.
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Table 4
Crosstab of Tsai Vote with Taiwan’s International Status
                         Taiwan’s International Status
Pres. Vote Unification Status Quo Independenc
e
TOTAL
Chu/Soong 67% 47% 11% 38%
Tsai 33% 53% 89% 62%
Gamma = .69
Sig   = .0004
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Table 5
Binomial Logistic Regression for Issues’ Impact on Tsai Vote
Dependent Variable:  Voted for Tsai
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood      1,200  
Chi Square               301 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .32
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
Independence    1.93    .19         .0004       6.91
Unification -.75    .15    .0004    .42
Economy Bad  .76    .15 .0004   2.05
Inequality Bad         .40    .15      .006        1.41
Govt Helps Public Welf   -.75    .15       .0004        .47 
Classification Analysis
Correct Predictions 








Binomial Logistic Regression for the Impact of
Issues and Demographics on Tsai Vote
Dependent Variable:  Voted for Tsai
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood        988  
Chi Square               336 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .39
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
Independence    1.79    .21         .0004       6.01
Unification -.74    .22    .001         .48
Economy Bad  .83    .17 .0004   2.30
Inequality Bad         .35    .17      .035        1.42
Govt Helps Public Welf   -.70    .16       .0004        .50 
South  .26    .17 .129   1.29
Min-nan Father  .28    .22 .189   1.33
Mainlander Father     -1.20    .32 .0004    .30
Income  .20    .17 .25   1.22
White Collar Occupation  .10    .18 .57   1.11
Education -.73    .23 .001    .48
Age -.59    .19 .001    .56












Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic
Factors on Issue Positions 
Dependent Variable:  Independence
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood      1,545 
Chi Square                82 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .09
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
South  .04    .13 .74   1.05
Min-nan Father  .31    .17 .072   1.36
Mainlander Father     -1.00    .30 .001    .37 
Income -.20    .13 .31    .87
White Collar Occupation   .15    .14 .27    .80
Education -.06    .21 .78   1.17
Age      -.81    .14 .0004    .45
Female -.02    .13 .87    .98
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Table 8
Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic
Factors on Issue Positions 
Dependent Variable:  Unification
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood        986 
Chi Square                44 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .04
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
South  .04    .13 .113   1.32
Min-nan Father      -.41    .23 .069    .66
Mainlander Father       .69    .27 .011   1.99
Income       .20    .18 .28   1.22
White Collar Occupation -.22    .18 .23    .80
Education -.06    .21 .78    .94
Age       .91    .21 .0004   2.49





Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic
Factors on Issue Positions 
Dependent Variable:  Economy Worse
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood        986 
Chi Square                44 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .05
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
South  .32    .12 .008   1.38
Min-nan Father  .26    .15 .087   1.30
Mainlander Father      -.04    .22 .85     .96 
Income -.10    .12 .42    .90
White Collar Occupation  -.20    .13 .128    .82
Education -.03    .16 .48    .85
Age       .62    .13 .0004   1.85
Female -.17    .12 .15    .85
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Table 10
Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic
Factors on Issue Positions 
Dependent Variable:  Inequality Bad
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood      1,736
Chi Square                44 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .04
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables      b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
South  .03    .12 .80   1.03
Min-nan Father  .44    .15 .005   1.55
Mainlander Father       .03    .22 .90    1.03 
Income -.17    .13 .18    .85
White Collar Occupation  -.16    .13 .21    .85
Education -.51    .17 .002    .60
Age       .16    .13 .20   1.18
Female  .02    .12 .87   1.02
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Table 11
Logistic Regression for the Impact of Demographic
Factors on Issue Positions 
Dependent Variable:  Government Promotes Public Welfare
Overall Equation
-2 Log Likelihood      1,692
Chi Square                62 
Sig.                   .0004
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2     .06
 
Separate Effects of                                    Adjusted
Independent Variables     b    St. Er.      Sig      Odds Ratio 
South -.29    .12 .02    .75
Min-nan Father       .06    .16 .71   1.06
Mainlander Father       .35    .27 .12    1.42
Income       .32    .13 .01   1.38
White Collar Occupation  .50    .13 .0003   1.64
Education  .21    .16 .19   1.24
Age      -.08    .13 .53    .92
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